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UTILITY-BASED REPUTATION MODEL FOR VO IN GRIDS 
 
В данной статье предложена модификация существующей модели репутаций для виртуальных 
организаций в Grid-системах, которая основана на оценке функции полезности. Модификация моде-
ли состоит в добавлении статистической модели поведения пользователя, которая ранее была разра-
ботана для компьютерных сетей и распределенных систем, а также компонентов, которые позволяют 
противостоять угрозам в области управления доверием и репутацией. К числу этих компонентов от-
носятся: механизм присвоения начальной репутации для новых субъектов виртуальной организации; 
учет взаимосвязей между пользователями и ресурсами; функция учета времени; а также классифика-
ция предоставляемых сервисов в Grid-системе. 
 
In this paper we extend the existing utility-based reputation model for VOs in Grids by incorporating a 
statistical model of user behaviour (SMUB) that was previously developed for computer networks and dis-
tributed systems, and different functions to address threats scenarios in the area of trust and reputation man-
agement. These modifications include: assigning initial reputation to a new entity in VO, capturing alliance 
between consumer and resource, time decay function, and score function. 
 
Introduction 
The key idea of Grid-systems is a coordi-
nated resource sharing and problem solving in 
dynamic, multi-institutional virtual organiza-
tions [1]. Therefore; mutual trust between users 
and resource providers is of high importance.  
Paper [2] demonstrates that trust is enabling 
technology and its implementation can provide 
the possibility to secure electronic transactions. 
Meanwhile trust is described as an important 
and sophisticated object dealing with honesty, 
truthfulness and reliability of trusted person or 
service. Nevertheless there still there is no 
common definition of trust [3]. Two main defi-
nitions can be given: 
— ”When we say we trust someone or that 
someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that 
the probability that he will perform an action 
that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us 
is high enough for us to consider engaging in 
some form of cooperation with him. Corre-
spondingly, when we say that someone is un-
trustworthy, we imply that that probability is 
low enough for us to refrain from doing so” [4] 
— ”the extent to which one party is willing 
to depend on something or somebody in a given 
situation with a feeling of a relative security, 
even though negative consequences are possi-
ble” [5] 
A set of individuals and/or institutions de-
fined by coordinated resource sharing rules 
form what we call a virtual organization (VO). 
Virtual organization is a temporary or per-
manent union of geographically spread indi-
viduals and/or institutions defined by coordi-
nated resource sharing rules, possibilities and 
information for reaching common goals [1]. 
VO’s are formed dynamically, exist for some 
time and then resolve. That is why the effi-
ciency of their work depends on trust. 
For monitoring and creation of such VO’s 
the reputation based trust management tech-
nologies are needed. 
Currently, such trust models are built based 
on entity reputation assessment and mostly 
where created for other areas of distributed sys-
tems. 
In common case under the reputation we un-
derstand the measure of reliability. With the 
help of reliability we can build a trust of one 
entity to another. According to [6], reputation is 
an assumption about the agent’s behavior based 
on existing information or observations about 
his behavior before. 
In this paper we extended the existing utility-
based reputation model [8] by incorporating a 
statistical model of user behaviour (SMUB) that 
was previously developed for computer net-
works and distributed systems [10, 11, 12, 13]. 
This model was originally used in intrusion de-
tection systems to detect anomalous patterns of 
user actions. Other modifications include: 
- assigning initial reputation to a new entity 
in VO: when organization provides a new re-
source to be integrated in VO there are no re-
cords from monitoring system to infer reputa-
tion value for this specific resource. One possi-
ble way of assigning initial reputation to a new 
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resource is to use the methodology of active ex-
periment. There can be several benchmark tasks 
in the system to estimate the utility function and 
to provide initial reputation of the resource. 
- alliance between consumer and resource: 
since reputation of resource is based on measure 
of satisfaction of a consumer in relation to this 
resource we should avoid cheating via collu-
sions among a group of entities [14]. For this 
purpose, it is advisable to include into the model 
a factor that will reflect an alliance between the 
consumer and the resource. 
- time decay function: reputation of resource 
is based on measuring average value of utility 
function over certain period of time [14]. But if 
VO exists for a considerable period of time (e.g. 
for years) reputation of resource may vary con-
siderably. That is, it is unlikely to use, for ex-
ample, two years data to estimate current re-
source reputation if more recent records are 
available. So, we propose to incorporate a time 
lag function into the model that will provide 
weights depending on the time of the transaction 
record between consumer and resource. 
- score function: for different types of ser-
vices offered by resource providers different 
reputation values will be used [15]. Namely, we 
will categorize services into categories, and a 
resource provider will get reputation value ac-
cording to such a category. In Grid systems, 
tasks can be categorised by computational com-
plexity. Successful execution of tasks with 
complex workflow and parallel programs (for 
example, environmental models like numerical 
weather prediction [16]) will provide to a re-
source provider higher reputation value. 
We will also study the described reputation 
model against the existing attacks and how the 
model overcomes them. In particular, we will 
follow security threat scenarios presented in 
[15]. These scenarios include: individual mali-
cious peers, malicious collectives, malicious 
collectives with camouflage, malicious spies, 
sybil attack, man in the middle attack, driving 
down the reputation of a reliable peer, partially 
malicious collectives, malicious pre-trusted 
peers. 
 
Related Works 
Up to date, there have been proposed several 
approaches of reputation models in grid sys-
tems. 
PathTrust [14] is a reputation system sug-
gested for choosing members of the VO whiles 
its formation. The organization has to register 
with the enterprise network by providing some 
certificates to enter the VO. Besides of user 
management enterprise network provides cen-
tralized reputation service. When the VO is re-
solved each member gives feedback values for 
reputation server and other members he had in-
teracted with. The proposed model feels the lack 
of dynamics, because the feedback value is col-
lected only when the VO is resolving. 
Paper [8] proposes utility-based reputation 
model that can be used for users, resources and 
resource providers’ assessment. This model is 
based on the calculating of the utility function 
that expresses the satisfaction of the entity with 
its interaction with other entities with respect to 
the key features specific for the assessable en-
tity. For resource reputation assessment this 
trust model demands the existence of monitor-
ing system for the quality of service data collec-
tion. But this paper does not highlight the ques-
tion of assigning initial reputation values for 
new users or resources.  
Paper [9] is solving the task of assessment of 
trust level between the agents of multi-agent 
system using the direct observation data and 
reputation information. Unlike other existing 
approaches that are based on the usage of heu-
ristics the proposed approach HABIT (Hierar-
chical And Bayesian Inferred Trust Model) is 
using statistical Bayesian methods. The advan-
tage of this model is the possibility of assessing 
trust values for new agents by searching for cor-
relation with known groups of agents. It is ex-
tremely important in cases when the truster has 
no previous experience or reputation data of 
trustee. In the model truster-trustee trust is 
sighted from the providing desirable quality of 
service point of view. It is obvious that the ra-
tional agent is functioning in purpose to gain the 
maximum of expected utility. 
 
Utility-based Reputation Model  
for VOs in Grids 
The reputation model described in this paper 
is based on the model proposed in [8]. The main 
additions are associated with reputation model 
for VO users, and extensions of three functions 
to resource provider model. In our model we 
will also use slightly modified notations as 
comparing to [8]. All proposed modifications 
are described in details in the following subsec-
tions. 
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Basic notations used in our paper 
The central notion in the reputation model is 
the organisation [8]. The organisation provides 
resources; and there exist users associated with 
this organisation (Fig. 1).  
Definition 1. Organization is a set: 
Org = _ , ,i j
i j
o id r u
  
 
  
∪ ∪ ,    (1) 
where o_id is an organisation’s identifier, i
i
r∪  
and j
j
u∪  are resources and users associated 
with this organisation, respectively. 
We will denote all existing organisations 
with n
n
Org∪ . 
Virtual organization (VO) can be modelled 
as a set of organisations. Organisations integrate 
their resources on a temporary or permanent ba-
sis to achieve common goals [1]. It is to be 
noted that in general case organisation may pro-
vide to a VO only a subset of its resources, and 
the same resource can be used in different VOs. 
The same stands for users of the organisation.  
Definition 2. VO is a set (Fig. 1): 
VO=
_ _
_ , , , (), ()k l vo id vo id
k l
vo id r u f g  
 
∪ ∪ , (2) 
where vo_id is a VO’s identifier, k
k
r∪  and 
l
l
u∪  are resources and users from multiple or-
ganisations that participate in VO, respectively, 
fvo_id() and gvo_id() are membership functions de-
fined in the following way 
fvo_id : k
k
r∪  → n
n
Org∪ , i.e. fvo_id(rk) = 
o_id 
(3) 
gvo_id : l
l
u∪  → n
n
Org∪ , i.e. gvo_id(ul) = 
o_id 
(4) 
 
Fig. 1. Correspondence between virtual or-
ganization, organizations, resources and users 
 
In general case, these functions can be main-
tained by the Virtual Organisation Membership 
Service (VOMS). Using these functions we can 
retrieve any required information on member-
ship of organisations, resources and users in 
VOs. According to (3) a set of resources pro-
vided by the organisation with identifier o_id in 
a specific VO with identifier vo_id is given by 
{ r∈ k
k
r∪  : fvo_id(r) = o_id } (5) 
We will denote this set as 
f-1vo_id(o_id). 
In the same, way according to (4), we can list 
all users from organisation with identifier o_id 
participating in VO with identifier vo_id: 
{ u∈ l
l
u∪ : gvo_id(u) = o_id } ≡ 
g-1vo_id(o_id) 
(6) 
Suppose we want to list all organisations 
from n
n
Org∪  that provide resources within 
specific VO with identifier vo_id, or whose us-
ers participate in this VO. According to (3), (4) 
such sets are given respectively by 
{Org∈ n
n
Org∪  : if ∃  r∈ k
k
r∪ that 
fvo_id(r) = o_id} 
(7) 
{Org∈ n
n
Org∪  : if ∃  u∈ l
l
u∪ that 
gvo_id (u) = o_id}. 
(8) 
Let us denote with m
m
VO∪  all existing VOs. 
Suppose we want to retrieve all VOs where a 
resource r from a specific organisation Org is 
used, or where user u from specific Org with 
identifier o_id participates in. According to (2), 
(3), (4) these sets are given respectively by 
{ VO∈ m
m
VO∪  : fvo_id(r) = o_id }≡ VO|r, (9) 
{ VO∈ m
m
VO∪  : gvo_id (u) = o_id }≡ VO|u. (10) 
These basic notions are used in the following 
subsections to describe reputation models for 
resource providers and users. 
 
Reputation model for resource providers 
The reputation model is based on the utility 
function that measures the level of satisfaction 
of a user in relation to resource provider. In or-
der to define utility function an auxiliary func-
tion that indicates the service level agreement 
(SLA) accorded between a VO user and a re-
source provider for a particular resource within 
a VO is implemented [8] 
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SLA : l
l
u∪  × k
k
r∪  × m
m
VO∪  → R (11) 
where R denotes the set of real numbers.  
SLA value represents quality of resource 
provider as expected by user [8]. Quality of 
Service (QoS) metrics that can be used to meas-
ure the level of satisfaction is described in [17, 
18]. Some papers also propose mechanisms for 
QoS negotiation and handling [19]. 
Definition 3. Event is a set: 
Event = T × l
l
u∪  × k
k
r∪  × m
m
VO∪  × 
{QoS name} × R 
(12) 
where T is a time domain. 
Therefore, the event is characterised by the 
following attributes 
{t, u, r, vo_id, QoS, ν} 
where t indicates time, QoS is a name indi-
cating QoS of interest, and ν is a real QoS value 
measured by Grid monitoring system after user-
resource interaction. 
Definition 4. Trace is the sequence of events 
(12): 
Trace = p
p
Event∪  = 
{ , , , , , p
p
t u r vo_id QoS ν}∪ . 
(13) 
Before defining utility function and reputa-
tion we will introduce three functions: the first 
one will characterise possible alliance between 
consumer and resource in order to avoid cheat-
ing, the second one will account for a time when 
utility was estimated, and the third one will pro-
vide different scores depending on the type of 
the provided service. These functions provide 
extensions to utility function and reputation 
originally proposed in [8]. 
Function h(u, r) will take value between 0 
and 1 and will show the level of alliance be-
tween user u and resource r. If there is no such 
alliance between targets, h(u, r) will have a 
higher value. For example, one possible way of 
defining h(u, r) is as follows 
1, if ( ) ( )
( , )
, if ( ) ( )
vo_id vo_id
vo_id vo_id
f r g u
h u r f r g uθ
≠
= 
=
 (14) 
where θ is a parameter.  
Function z(t, tc) will show what past records 
on user-resources interactions should be taken 
into consideration to estimate reputation of spe-
cific resource. Here t is the time, and tc is a pa-
rameter. In a simplest form z(t, tc) could be a 
stepwise function 
1,( , )
0,
c
c
c
t t
z t t
t t
≥
= 
<
 (15) 
Function s(type(r)) will provide different 
values for different types of services provided 
by the resource r (function type(r) maps into 
category of service). 
Now, we can define a utility function accord-
ing to (11), (12), (14): 
utility : Event → R, 
utility({t, u, r, vo_id, QoS, ν}) = 
( , ) ( ), if ( , , _ )
( , ) ( ), if ( , , _ )( , , _ )
h u r s r SLA u r vo id
h u r s r SLA u r vo id
SLA u r vo id
ν
ν
ν
≥

 <

. 
(16) 
Let us denote a set of traces that are used to 
estimate the reputation of resource r in VO with 
identifier vo_id up to the current time t with 
Trace|(vo_id, r, t) = 
{ , , , , ,  :
, _ ,
t u r vo_id QoS Trace
r r vo id vo_id t t
ν′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′}∈ 
 
′ ′ ′= = ≤ 
. 
(17) 
Let us denote a set of utility() function values 
derived from traces Trace|(vo_id, r, t) (15), (17) 
with 
O(vo_id, r, t) = { z(t, tc)·utility({t, u, r, 
vo_id, QoS, ν}) |  {t, u, r, vo_id, QoS, 
ν}∈  Trace|(vo_id, r, t)} 
(18) 
Definition 5. Reputation is expectation of 
utility() function: 
rep(vo_id, r, t) = E[ utility(O(vo_id, r, t)) ] 
= 
( _ , , ) ( _ , , ) ( _ , , )( ) ( )vo id r t utility vo id r t vo id r tutility O p O dO∫
. 
(19) 
If we do not want to discriminate values from 
utility() function by time then we might use 
z(t, tc) = 1. 
In order to approximate expectation we can 
use a sample mean (18) 
rep(vo_id, r, t) = 
( _ , , )( _ , , )
1
vo id r tx Ovo id r t
x
O ∈
∑  (20) 
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. 
The reputation of an organisation in VO is 
the aggregation of the reputation of all resources 
it provides to VO according to (5), (15), (19): 
rep(vo_id, t) = 
1
1
( )
1 ( , , )( )
vo_idr f o_idvo_id
rep vo_id r tf o_id −− ∈ ∑
. 
(21) 
The reputation of a resource in all VOs ac-
cording to (19) can be estimated as follows 
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rep(r, t) = 
VO
1 ( , , )
VO
rvo_idr
rep vo_id r t
∈
∑ . (22) 
Reputation model for users 
In the reputation model proposed in [8] the 
corresponding model for user is built using a 
penalty function. If a user performs an action 
that does not conform to a VO or resource pol-
icy, the user is charged with a penalty. This 
penalty is used to estimate utility function for 
the user, and subsequently a reputation of the 
user. But audit of user actions and checking 
these actions against the VO or resource policy 
is a difficult task, especially from implementa-
tion perspective. There should be clearly de-
fined criteria to assess user actions and corre-
sponding program components to do that. 
We propose to include into the reputation 
model a statistical model of user behaviour 
(SMUB) that was developed for computer net-
works and further modified for distributed sys-
tems, in particular Grid systems [10, 11, 12, 13]. 
This model is based on the analysis of statistical 
data that is gathered after a user executes ac-
tions in a Grid system. The model was trained 
and verified on real data that was collected from 
GILDA infrastructure (https://gilda.ct.infn.it) of 
the EGEE project. The model was able to dis-
criminate behaviour of different types of users 
and to detect synthetically generated intrusions 
with a rate of more than 90%. 
In particular, the model accounts for different 
statistical parameters given by the following at-
tributes 
{S, ET, CPU, WT, CW, ES, CT, STD, RAM, 
VM, VO, RB}, 
where S is a site where a user task was exe-
cuted, ET is a execution target, CPU is a task 
CPU time, WT is a task wall time, CW is de-
fined as CPUWall = CPU/W, ES is a task exit 
status (success or with errors), CT is a task crea-
tion time in Grid system, STD is a start time dif-
ference, i.e. difference between time when a 
task started to execute on computational re-
source and time when task was sent to Grid sys-
tem by the user, RAM is a volume of RAM used 
by user task, VM is a volume of virtual memory 
used by user task, VO is a virtual organization a 
user belongs to, RB is a resource broker host-
name that was used to schedule the user task. 
This set of parameters is used to detect 
anomalous patterns in user actions to raising 
alarms in the system. Such patterns could in-
clude, for example, situations when a task is 
running for a significant amount of time, or 
when the CPU utilization is up to 100% [20]. In 
order to detect such patterns from data that was 
logged during user activities we use intelligent 
techniques, namely neural networks [21]—a 
multilayer perceptron (MLP) trained by means 
of extended-delta-bar-delta (EDBD) algorithm 
[22] which represents a fast modification of 
standard error backpropagation algorithm [23]. 
For each user a neural network is trained to 
form an opinion to discriminate between the 
normal and abnormal user behaviour. When 
neural network is trained a target output is set to 
1 for input data that corresponds to the normal 
user behaviour, and to 0 for data that corre-
sponds to the abnormal user behaviour. In order 
to represent both situations (normal and abnor-
mal) in training data sets we use records from 
Grid monitoring system: records about past user 
actions represent the normal behaviour while 
records from other users and synthetically gen-
erated data represent the abnormal user behav-
iour. The synthetic data can be generated using 
generative models [24] and incorporated into 
the training data sets in order to represent ab-
normal patterns that were not present in data 
sets from monitoring system. Therefore, neural 
network acts as a classifier. If we put an inde-
pendent sample (not present in the training data 
set) to neural network input the output value 
will be between 1 and 0. This value can be 
treated as a posterior probability of nor-
mal/abnormal user behaviour: higher values cor-
respond to normal actions while lower values 
correspond to potential anomalous patterns. 
In such a way, we propose to use the output 
of the SMUB model in order to estimate the 
reputation of user in VO. Such a user model will 
be specific to a VO depending on its goals and 
types of tasks being executed. For example, VO 
can be oriented on applications that require exe-
cution of large number of tasks with relatively 
small amount of data to be processed by a single 
task. In such a VO, tasks that consume almost 
full amount of RAM and virtual memory of re-
sources would be considered as an anomalous 
pattern. In turn, other VOs can be oriented on 
applications where a single task consists of a 
number of elementary tasks each processing 
large amount of data (an example includes Earth 
science domain and satellite data processing 
[25, 26]). 
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Let us provide a formal description of the 
reputation model for user based on the SMUB 
model as it was done for the reputation model 
for resource provider in previous subsection. 
Definition 6. Event for the user is a set: 
Event = {t, u, r, vo_id, x}. (23) 
where x = (S, ET, CPU, WT, CW, ES, CT, STD, 
RAM, VM, VO, RB). 
Definition 7. Trace corresponds to the se-
quence of events: 
Trace = p
p
Event∪  = 
{ , , , , p
p
t u r vo_id }x∪ . 
(24) 
An analogue of utility() function (as it was 
defined for resource providers) is defined in the 
following way 
utility : Event → R, 
utility({t, u, r, vo_id, x}) = 
SMUB(u, vo_id)(x), 
(25) 
where SMUB(u, vo_id)(x) is an output of the 
SMUB model.  
It should be noted that, in general case, under 
utility() function for users we can use other user 
behaviour models (e.g. [27, 28]) or a combina-
tion of different models to capture different as-
pects and patterns of user behaviour. 
In our case, according to (24), the SMUB 
transformation is performed by a neural net-
work, and specific to user and VO. Let us de-
note a set of traces that are used to estimate the 
reputation of user u in VO with identifier vo_id 
up to the current time t with 
Trace|(vo_id, u, t) = 
{ , , , ,  :
, _ ,
t u r vo_id Trace
u u vo id vo_id t t
′ ′ ′ ′ ′}∈ 
 
′ ′ ′= = ≤ 
x
. 
(26) 
Let us denote a set of utility() function values 
derived from traces Trace|(vo_id, u, t), according to 
(15), (25), (26) with 
O(vo_id, u, t) = { z(t, tc)· utility({t, u, r, 
vo_id, x}) |  {t, u, r, vo_id, x}∈  
Trace|(vo_id, u, t)} 
(27) 
Definition 8. Reputation is the expectation of 
utility() function (25),(27) 
rep(vo_id, u, t) = E[ utility(O(vo_id, u, t)) 
] = 
( _ , , ) ( _ , , ) ( _ , , )( ) ( )vo id u t utility vo id u t vo id u tutility O p O dO∫
. 
(28) 
 
In order to approximate expectation we can 
use a sample mean 
 
rep(vo_id, u, t) = (29) 
( _ , , )( _ , , )
1
vo id u tx Ovo id u t
x
O ∈
∑ . 
The reputation of an organisation in VO 
(from users’ perspective) is the aggregation of 
the reputation of all users that participate in VO. 
According to (6), (29) 
rep(vo_id, t) = 
1
1
( )
1 ( , , )( )
vo_idr g o_idvo_id
rep vo_id u t
g o_id −− ∈
∑ . (30) 
According to (2), (10), (29) the reputation of 
a user in all VOs can be estimated as follows 
rep(r, t) = 
VO
1 ( , , )
VO
uvo_idu
rep vo_id u t
∈
∑  (31) 
 
Analysis of Attacks 
In this section we will study different secu-
rity threats scenarios in the area of trust and 
reputation management that were proposed in 
[15], and analyse how the proposed model re-
sponds to these attacks. It should be noted that 
some of these attacks can be handled by the ex-
isting mechanisms already implemented in Grid 
systems. 
Individual malicious peers. Malicious peers 
always provide bad services. From Grid per-
spective, there can be either a resource that al-
ways provides unreliable services, or malicious 
user that always tries to harm a system. Such an 
unreliable resource will provide poor services to 
the users that will result in 
( , , _ )SLA u r vo idν << , and thus the reputation 
of this resource will be low. Moreover, such re-
source will get no or few number of tasks when 
reputation is incorporated into resource broker 
to schedule tasks among resources of Grid sys-
tem. As to the malicious users, the output of the 
user behaviour model SMUB(u, vo_id)(x) will be 
always low, close to 0. Thus, tasks submitted by 
the user could be cancelled. 
Malicious collectives. This is a threat when 
malicious peers form a malicious collective. In 
Grids, there could be a user that tries illegally to 
improve the reputation of a particular resource. 
If the user and resource belong to the same or-
ganization that kind of behaviour will be cap-
tured by the alliance function h(u, r). In order to 
improve the reputation value considerably the 
user will need to submit a lot of simple tasks. In 
such a case the reputation value of the resource 
will be bounded with the s(type(r)) function. If 
the user wants to keep illegally the reputation of 
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the resource at a high level over a long period of 
time, he or she will need to constantly submit 
tasks since the reputation is accumulated only 
over specific period of time. Such behavioural 
patterns will be detected by the SMUB model, 
and the user may be punished with a reputation 
for such actions. 
Malicious collectives with camouflage. This 
is a threat which is not always easy to tackle, 
since its resilience will mostly depend on the 
behavioural pattern followed by malicious peers 
[15]. These correspond to the malicious collec-
tives with the variable behaviour. In our model, 
such variability could be detected using SMUB 
model. Moreover, reputation value for such us-
ers will vary considerably over the time as well. 
Therefore, with such an approach it is possible 
to punish such wit the reputation. 
But it is to be noted that patterns of user be-
haviour could be various, and it is very difficult 
to build a model that will capture all the possi-
ble situations. Thus, the success of detecting 
malicious collectives with camouflage greatly 
depends on the model of user behaviour. 
Malicious spies. This a threat when mali-
cious peers (spies) always provide good services 
when selected as service providers, but they also 
give the maximum rating values to those mali-
cious peers who always provide bad services. In 
Grids this corresponds to the situation when a 
user with high reputation provides the maxi-
mum rating to unreliable resources. This type of 
threat was already described in malicious col-
lectives subsection. 
Sybil attack. An adversary initiates a large 
number of malicious peers in the system. Each 
time one of the peers is the system is scheduled 
as a resource provider it provides malicious ser-
vice and after that it is disconnected and re-
placed by another peer [15, 20, 29]. In Grids, 
such an attack is hardly implemented since ap-
propriate certificate should be obtained from 
certificate authority in order to integrate a re-
source into the Grid system. Another way to 
tackle this problem is to use the methodology of 
active experiment to monitor the availability of 
resources. 
On the other hand, this attack may become a 
threat when Grids are integrated with the Sensor 
Web or sensor networks. Sybil attack imple-
mented through the sensor web could cause 
harm to Grid entities. But security issues relat-
ing to the integration of Grids and Sensor Web 
are out of scope of this paper and should be in-
vestigated in the future works. 
Man in the middle attack. A malicious peer 
can intercept the messages between other peers, 
rewrite the message and change reputation val-
ues. Our model relies on the existing Grid secu-
rity mechanisms to tackle this attack [20].  
Driving down the reputation of a reliable 
peer. Malicious peers give the worst rating to 
those benevolent peers, who indeed provide 
good services. Projecting on to the Grids, a ma-
licious user will provide poor ratings to the re-
sources, though user’s tasks were completed 
successfully with appropriate QoS value. One 
possible way to tackle this problem is that tasks 
of users with low reputation value are never sent 
to resources with high reputation by the re-
source broker. Moreover, QoS metrics in Grids 
are measured by the monitoring system, and to 
change these values, and consequently reputa-
tion, the malicious user should crack it. 
Partially malicious collectives. Malicious 
peers provide malicious actions for some kind 
of services, and, for others, they provide good 
services. In Grids, this threat corresponds to us-
ers with variable behaviour (covered in mali-
cious collectives with camouflage subsection), 
and to resources that for some types of services 
provide poor. By just considering a different 
score for every service offered by a resource, 
this threat is mitigated most of the times [15]. 
That is why we included into our model a score 
function to provide different reputation values 
for different types of tasks executed by re-
sources. 
Malicious pre-trusted peers. Some models 
are based on the strategy that there is a set of 
peers that can be trusted before any transaction 
is carried out in the system (known as pre-
trusted peers) [30]. Our model does not include 
the notion of pre-trusted peers. 
 
Reputation Management System 
Developed model could be used by VOs with 
reputation management system. Paper [8] 
presents the architecture of such reputation 
management system in order to facilitate the 
rating of both VO resources and VO users. The 
architecture is shown in Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Reputation management in VOs 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we extended the existing utility-
based reputation model [8] by incorporating a 
statistical model of user behaviour (SMUB) that 
was previously developed for computer net-
works and distributed systems, and different 
functions to address threats scenarios in the area 
of trust and reputation management that were 
proposed in [15]. These modifications include: 
assigning initial reputation to a new entity in 
VO, capturing alliance between consumer and 
resource, time decay function, and score func-
tion. We analysed the described reputation 
model against the existing attacks and how the 
model overcomes them following security threat 
scenarios presented in [15]. 
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